In a situation of type B, on the other hand, two chains are triggered with an indeterminate overall result.

The type-A mechanism has to do with what happens at the beginning of the causal chain. Sometimes this leads to escape, but sometimes the prey ignores the predator. For instance, the prey detects the predator. In a situation of type A, either this or that causal chain is triggered, but we do not know which one. From his characterization of mechanisms it follows that there are two general kinds of mechanism: those of type A are triggered under unknown conditions by contrast, type-B mechanisms have indeterminate consequences. Most importantly, Elster notices that mechanisms often come in pairs, as is the case in the alcoholism example. Mechanisms, it seems, are explanatory in their own right. Whether or not we can predict a causal pattern, a demonstration that something is an instance of a causal pattern will satisfy many explanatory criteria. For every child who becomes alcoholic, as he or she grows up, in response to an alcohol-abusive environment, another avoids alcoholism in response to the same environment. 1Įlster illustrates explanation by mechanism with the case of alcoholism. This epistemic conception of mechanisms is somewhat unusual, and indeed it deserves special scrutiny precisely because it differs from several other conceptions in this respect. This is in keeping with his general aim to characterize mechanisms in a way that makes them depend on our epistemic condition: a mechanism belongs to the (partly ignorant) social scientist’s worldview rather than the world itself. He is interested merely in consequences that are indeterminate relative to what we know. (Elster 2007, 36 original emphasis)Įlster is careful to point out that he is not assuming objective, knowledge-independent indeterminacy. They allow us to explain, but not to predict. Roughly speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences. I shall argue later, however, that although Elster’s suggestion is promising, his conception of mechanisms is unsuitable for the task.įirst, the characterization of mechanisms (Elster refers to it occasionally as a definition of mechanism): Both have been conceived in a variety of ways, but for the purpose of this article I will follow Elster. To make Elster’s suggestion precise one needs to specify both what a law is and what a mechanism is. In practice, then, Elsterian mechanisms could be doing all the explanatory work-quite an ambitious proposal. And in any case, since relevant laws are scarce in social contexts, the ideal is seldom useful. His claim is rather that, this ideal notwithstanding, mechanisms occupy an available position between laws and mere descriptions. In one sense Elster is relatively modest, in that he does not challenge the law-perspective as an explanatory ideal. It is primarily in the absence of laws that Jon Elster finds a use for mechanisms in social science. Moreover, even if the possibility is rarely realized in that way, it raises, simply as a possibility, a conceptual problem with Elster’s mechanistic framework. If this possibility is realized in social science settings, as I argue it might well be, Elster’s mechanistic account is threatened. We might then find ourselves in the paradoxical position of knowing more relevant causal truths about the phenomenon we are interested in than we did before, but being able to explain less. As our causal knowledge of a specific problem grows we might come to know too much to make use of an Elsterian mechanism but still lack a law. However, his mechanisms suffer from a characteristic problem that I will explore in this article. Elster develops an interesting substitute: a special kind of mechanism designed to fill the explanatory gap between laws and mere description. His main concern is that they have so few well-established laws. Jon Elster worries about the explanatory power of the social sciences.

Elster online download 2012